European countries, we argue that one-size-fits-all reform strategies are unlikely to be successful.
Introduction
Since Joseph Schumpeter's (1934) seminal work, the view that an economy's long-term growth depends on its ability to exploit innovations has gained much traction (Cohen 2010) . The function of creating these innovations is typically ascribed to the entrepreneur, who Schumpeter and others came to see as the primus motor for economic growth (Henrekson and Stenkula 2007: 23) . Entrepreneurs do not operate in a vacuum, however; they are constrained and enabled by their institutional environment (Estrin et al. 2013; North 1990; Aldrich 2011) . Formal and informal institutions affect and incentivize individual behavior, thereby influencing the extent and productive character of an economy's entrepreneurship and, consequently, its economic development (Baumol 1990; Mueller and Thomas 2000; Hwang and Powell 2005; Acs et al. 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Stenholm et al. 2013; Urbano and Alvarez 2014) .
As the European Union struggles with economic problems, the necessity of institutional reforms across its 28 member states is becoming increasingly obvious, with the goal of increasing economic efficiency and enabling a transition to a more entrepreneurial economy (Audretsch 2007; Audretsch and Thurik 2000) . A best-practice reform approach is to identify a country (whether a member or nonmember) that appears to be performing well in a particular institutional dimension and to promote and adopt this institution in other countries (Rodrik 2008) . However, such an approach neglects the fact that each country has evolved its particular bundle institutions, many of which are complementary to one another (Hall and Soskice 2001) . For example, excessive taxation of stock options gains effectively bars the development of a vibrant venture capital industry (Henrekson and Sanandaji 2014a) . Reforms that fail to account for institutional complementarities risk rendering the overall institutional system less efficient (Braunerhjelm and Henrekson 2015: 26) . This challenge may explain, for example, why European imitation of policies aimed at stimulating venture capital has been unsuccessful (European Commission 2011 .
Institutional complementarities are central to the logic permeating the varieties of capitalism approach to comparative politics (Hall and Soskice 2001) . Given their existence, one cannot simply compensate for a major weakness in one institutional element by improving other elements. Rather, a prudent and viable reform approach is to identify and eliminate major institutional bottlenecks (Acs et al. 2014b ).
Furthermore, complementarities imply that good performance may be associated with multiple institutional forms (Amable 2003: 5; Calmfors and Driffil 1988; Freeman 2000) .
In this paper, we will analyze the present entrepreneurial climate across EU member states and identify institutions that are potentially relevant to this climate. Studies with a similar focus have been conducted previously. Notably, the national system of entrepreneurship approach, pioneered by Acs et al. (2014a) , takes a step in this direction by emphasizing the "dynamic, institutionally embedded interaction between entrepreneurial attitudes, activities, and aspirations, by individuals, which drives the allocation of resources through the creation and operation of new ventures." 1 Our approach is similar, as we combine formal macro-level institutional features with informal institutions, including individual attitudes toward entrepreneurship. However, rather than ranking national economies in terms of how entrepreneurial they are, we focus on varieties of institutional forms and how they relate to entrepreneurial regimes.
We study 21 European countries and include the United States as a point of comparison because it is typically perceived as a successful entrepreneurial society. We identify a number of potentially relevant entrepreneurship indicators as well as potentially relevant formal and informal institutions. To identify institutional complementarities, we employ two techniques that have been previously used in the varieties of capitalism literature (e.g., Amable 2003): we use principal component analysis to construct orthogonal dimensions from the measures at hand and employ cluster analysis to determine how countries cluster in these dimensions.
Our results are consistent with previous typologies suggested in the varieties of capitalism literature, with a number of important differences. The first cluster consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. Despite striking similarities in their formal and informal institutions, the countries actually differ in their entrepreneurial regimes. The Nordic countries are similar across all institutional dimensions and in their entrepreneurial regime. Contrary to the previous varieties of capitalism literature, however, wide variation exists across continental Europe. Switzerland, the Netherlands and Austria form a group with an entrepreneurial regime akin to the Nordic regime but with another bundle of institutions, whereas Belgium and France form another cluster with similarities in all of the examined dimensions. Germany, however, clusters with the Mediterranean countries. All the Eastern European countries form a final group, as they are relatively similar across all dimensions.
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, we add to the varieties of capitalism typology by considering institutions that have been identified as important determinants of the entrepreneurial climate. Second, as a consequence of the first point, we highlight the presence of varieties of entrepreneurial regimes in Europe. Hence, a one-size-fits-all policy approach is unlikely to be successful in promoting European entrepreneurship. For example, although considering the U.S.
experience as a reference point may assist in formulating a reform strategy for Ireland and England, differences in the institutional structure in other European countries highlight the need for strategies that are explicitly tailored for those countries.
1 Braunerhjelm and Henrekson (2015: 7) consider this approach important but ultimately insufficient, as "the institutional variables that are used, such as technology absorption, gender equality, R&D spending, and depth of capital markets, are not institutional variables; they are outcomes resulting from the evolution of the economic system in a given institutional setup." Issues related to data availability raise similar concerns for the current study, as some of our measures are outcome variables rather than direct measures of the institutional structure. Focusing only on direct measures would come at the cost of excluding potentially important determinants of entrepreneurial activity, such as educational attainment. To address this concern, we check the robustness of our findings by excluding the outcome-related indicators. We return to this issue in section 4.
main driver of the differences between the varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001: 17-18; Aoki 1994; Ebner 2010) . Institutions are complementary if the presence or efficiency of one institution increases the returns from or efficiency of the other. Conversely, they are substitutable if the absence or inefficiency of one institution increases the returns of using the other (Voigt and Kiwit 1998; See
Ebner 2010 for a formal expression). The point is that "nations with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of the economy should tend to develop complementary practices in other spheres as well" (Hall and Soskice 2001: 18) . Therefore, institutional practices should not be randomly distributed across nations. Rather, we should be able to observe country clustering in the dimensions that divide varieties of capitalism from one another (cf. Hölzl 2006; Page 2006; Pagano 2011 ).
The existence of institutional complementarities implies that viable policy changes must be compatible with existing institutional patterns. In Ebner's view (2010) , institutional change will be incremental, as it must contain a wide array of linkages among institutional subsystems. However, complementarity may also mean that a specific change will not stay localized, but instead have effects that extend throughout the institutional system. The fear of such snowballing can explain the existence of institutional inertia, as even piecemeal changes are blocked for fear that they will lead to major changes (Amable 2003: 7; Aoki 2001) .
In their original formulation, Hall and Soskice (2001) emphasize coordination and the presence of institutions that enable (i) the exchange of information, (ii) monitoring of behavior, and the (iii) sanctioning of defections from cooperation, and "it is for the presence of such institutions that we look when comparing nations" (Hall and Soskice 2001: 9-11; cf. Ostrom 1990) . These researchers identify a core distinction between two types of political economies: liberal market economies, in which firms coordinate their activities primarily via firm hierarchies and competitive market arrangements (cf. Williamson 1985) , and coordinated market economies, in which coordination relies more heavily on non-market relationships. 2 Other varieties of institutional structures have been considered and examined before and since their work (see, e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990; Albert 1991; Amable et al. 1997; Amable 2003) .
Previous research suggests that entrepreneurship has numerous important prerequisites, such as education (Kuratko 2005; Béchard and Grégoire 2005) , the labor market (Poschke 2013) , and taxes (Cullen and Gordon 2007 The empirical analysis of this paper is divided into two parts. In section 3, we consider each of the aforementioned areas separately, and in section 4, we synthesize the results by considering them simultaneously.
The Empirical Evidence
To undertake our analysis, we employ two techniques that have previously been used in the varieties of capitalism literature (e.g., Amable 2003) . Principal component analysis is used to construct orthogonal dimensions from the measures at hand, and cluster analysis is used to identify how countries cluster in these dimensions.
Principal component analysis reduces the dimensionality of a dataset with a large number of interrelated variables, with minimal information loss (Jolliffe 2002) . This method produces a minimum number of uncorrelated and orthogonal principal components-linear combinations of weighted observed variables that explain a maximum amount of variance in the indicators.
Traditionally, components with an eigenvalue equal to or greater than 1 are retained, but given the scope of our task, we are occasionally stricter and choose higher benchmarks. The components are rotated to facilitate interpretation (Abdi and Williams, 2010).
Meanwhile, cluster analysis enables us to identify homogenous groups of observations with maximal within-group similarity combined with maximal between-group dissimilarity (Gatignon 2010: 295) . In this section, we employ these two techniques to define the five areas of interest. Notably, the area to which an indicator belongs is sometimes unclear, as pension funds, for example, could be considered either labor market institutions or financial institutions. However, because all indicators are evaluated together in section 4, such choices do not prompt concerns regarding the overall conclusions that can be drawn from the study.
To conserve space, we do not provide details regarding the variables included in this section. An overview of the data sources, the content of the variables, the ways they are measured and their descriptive statistics can be found in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix.
Entrepreneurial Regimes
Today, the importance of entrepreneurship is generally undisputed (Baumol 2010; Lazear 2005; Caree and Thurik 2010) , but its definition and measurement are topics of considerable debate. While many regional policies aim to increase the prevalence of new and small firms (e.g., Fischer and Nijkamp 1988; Sternberg 2012) , "most small businesses are best described as permanently small rather than as nascent entrepreneurial firms" Sanandaji 2014b: 1760; cf. Nightingale and Coad 8 2014) . Researchers increasingly emphasize the need to focus on measures that adequately capture innovative and growth-oriented entrepreneurship (Shane 2009; Stam et al. 2012; Henrekson and Sanandaji 2014b) and on the distinction between opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship (i.e., whether one becomes an entrepreneur because of a good business idea or other considerations, such as a lack of a better means of earning a living (Vivarelli 2013 The principal component analysis yields three components with an eigenvalue above one. Together, they explain 69.8% of the variation in the data. Table 1 shows how each variable loads onto the three components. Notably, the opportunity entrepreneurship measures contribute to defining each of the three dimensions described above. In the first dimension, they are on the negative side in a dimension that can be described as necessity-based nascent activity. In the second dimension, new and established opportunity-driven businesses are juxtaposed with high-risk aversion. In the third dimension, a tradeoff between opportunity entrepreneurship and established activities emerges. Overall, this result suggests that opportunity-driven entrepreneurship can occur in both new and incumbent businesses (dimension 2) and can be missing in both nascent activities (dimension 1) and established activities (dimension 3). We refer the reader to Figures A1 and A2 in the appendix to observe how the countries score in these three dimensions. Here, we focus on how countries cluster when we consider all three dimensions simultaneously. We therefore undertake cluster analysis using the Ward algorithm to group countries according to predicted values from the first three principal components. The result of this exercise is displayed as a dendrogram in Figure 1 .
On the far left, we observe a group of countries (Austria, the United Kingdom, Finland, the 
Political, economic and financial institutions
The importance of financial, economic and political regulatory institutions for entrepreneurship and economic growth is well established. Gordon (2004) and Bosma and Harding (2007) claim that growth differences between the United
States and Europe are due to differences in the quality of regulation. Excessive product market regulations deter entry, reduce firm growth and impede aggregate growth and productivity (Djankov et al. 2007; Gentry and Hubbard 2000; Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003; Arnold et al. 2008; Ciccone and Papaionnou 2006; Ardagna and Lusardi 2010) . Costs associated with regulatory compliance are particularly damaging to new and small firms (Glaeser and Kerr 2009; Fonseca et al. 2001; , and the positive effects associated with skills (education) are considerably weaker in more regulated economies, particularly for opportunity-based entrepreneurship ( 6 The four channels are (i) an absolute effect, whereby an absolute increase in the taxation of entrepreneurs lowers the supply and effort of potential entrepreneurs by lowering the expected after-tax reward (see, e.g., OECD 1998); (ii) a relative effect, whereby taxation alters the relative return of different activities, which can positively influence some forms of entrepreneurial activities in the economy; (iii) an evasion effect, where one decides to become an entrepreneur or to be self-employed in order to exploit opportunities that decrease the tax burden, such as underreporting incomes or overstating costs (Robson and Wren 1999; Engström and Holmlund 2009); and (iv) an insurance effect, as proportional taxation with full loss offset may encourage risk taking and thereby stimulate entrepreneurship (Domar and Musgrave 1944) . By contrast, a progressive tax system with imperfect loss offset is more likely to discourage entrepreneurship (Gentry and Hubbard 2000; Cullen and Gordon 2007) .
Principal component analysis reveals four components with an eigenvalue larger than 1, as shown in Table 2 . Together, these components explain 75.4% of the variation in the data, but the first component singlehandedly explains more than half of the total data variation.
The first component has an eigenvalue of 10.3 and explains 51.3% of the variation in the data. Nearly all variables point in the same direction along the first axis, indicating the existence of a "size effect" (Escoffier and Pagès 1998) . The two variables with the highest positive loadings are FI legal structure and property rights protection and QoG Rule of Law. We interpret this to mean that countries are primarily differentiated according to the general quality of their legal systems.
The second component has an eigenvalue of 2.1 and explains a more modest 10.4% of the variation.
Interestingly, the variable FI small size of government has the highest positive loading, whereas QoG Political Stability has the highest negative loading. A possible interpretation is that a state's scope and scale must be sufficient to maintain political stability.
The third dimension has an eigenvalue of 1.7 and explains 8.6% of the variation. This dimension loads highest on the positive side in DB registering property and on the negative side in DB protecting minority investors, suggesting a potential tradeoff between the protection of minority investors and the ease by which property can be registered. Finally, the fourth component, with an eigenvalue of 1.2, explains 6.1% of the variation and exhibits its highest positive loading for FI access to sound money, in contrast to QoG Political Stability, which again shows the highest negative loading.
Figures A3 and A4 in the appendix show countries' representations in the first and second factorial planes, respectively. The results of the cluster analysis are displayed in Figure 2 , which confirms the importance of the first dimension, as countries cluster into groups primarily based on how they score in this dimension. The left-hand side in the dendrogram shows the group of countries that scored highest in this dimension and that can thus be described as having high-quality legal systems. All countries in this group are Western European, except the United States. Of this group, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States are prominent as having high scores in the second dimension, suggesting that these countries have good legal systems but also that their smaller governments are less politically stable.
On the right-hand side, the larger group can also be divided into two subgroups. The first consists of a group of countries (Belgium, France, Portugal, Estonia and Spain) with moderate scores in the first dimension (and positive scores in the fourth dimension, although they are quite different in magnitude). The second group consists of the bulk of Eastern European countries and Italy, united by their negative scores in the first dimension. 
Labor market institutions and social spending
The welfare literature has shown that labor market institutions and social spending are closely related Stringent, inflexible labor institutions are an obstacle to entrepreneurial activity that may inhibit creative destruction (Djankov et al. 2002; Desai et al. 2003; Caballero and Hammour (2000) and lower firms' innovative performance (Kaiser et al. 2011; Braunerhjelm et al. 2014; Scarpetta and Tressel 2004) . More stringent labor market regulations appear to lead to lower rates of firm entry ( According to Henrekson and Sanandaji (2014) , decentralized wage-setting institutions encourage (potential) high-growth firms. Under generous social security systems, people are believed to have little incentive to establish their own businesses (Sinn 1996; Wennekers et al. 2005) , although no systematic evidence of this link has been provided (Braunerhjelm and Henrekson 2015 opportunity cost of resigning from a tenured system to pursue self-employment is substantially lower in Denmark than in Sweden, where security is tied to tenure.
The ways in which countries organize their pension systems are also relevant. Pension funds are less likely than business angels or VC firms to channel funds to entrepreneurs, and hence, if individuals are required to maintain a larger portion of their savings in national pension funds, the availability of small business financing will suffer (Braunerhjelm and Henrekson 2015) . However, pension funds can provide financial sources for young start-ups. For instance, since 2014, Danish Growth Capital, a government investment, has aimed to improve access to risk capital for entrepreneurs and SMEs by creating a fund-of-funds with pension funds contributing one-third of the fund (OECD 2015a).
To obtain an overview of how labor market and social spending institutions are organized, we use a number of indicators from the OECD database that are potentially relevant for entrepreneurial activity The principal component analysis reveals four components with an eigenvalue above 2 (we ignore a fifth component with an eigenvalue of 1.02), together explaining 71% of the variation in the data. The second component has an eigenvalue of 3.50 and explains 21% of the variation. All the highest loading indicators are positive in this component. The finding that it appears to be determined by the three pension replacement rate variables and Social spending labor suggests that it captures the extent to which a country's pension and social system caters to the needs of its working population.
The third component has an eigenvalue of 2.40 and explains 14% of the variation in the data, with
Total social spending and Social spending on unemployment having the highest loadings, both of which are positive. Thus, this component largely appears to capture the amount of overall social spending, with a focus on unemployment, in which a higher score indicates a more generous social welfare regime. The fourth component, with an eigenvalue of 2.01, is more difficult to interpret.
Whereas trade union density and social spending in family load negatively, social spending on health and the size of pension funds determine the positive side of this component.
Figures A5 and A6 in the appendix reveal how countries score in the four dimensions. In Figure 3 , we show how countries are grouped when we use cluster analysis to consider all four dimensions simultaneously. On the right-hand side, the Nordic countries, the Anglo-Saxon countries, Switzerland and the Netherlands form a group that scores particularly high on the first component, suggesting that they prioritize large pension funds and other forms of social spending over social spending on survivors and the elderly. 9 Here, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland are notable for scoring negatively in the second dimension, with lower pension replacement rates than the other countries.
On the left-hand side we find the Mediterranean, Eastern European and Continental European countries, all of which have low scores in the first dimension and hence appear to prioritize social spending on the elderly and survivors. This group clusters into two subgroups primarily based on the fourth component, for which the Eastern European countries have negative scores; thus, these countries perform better in terms of trade union density and social spending on family than in terms of pension funds and social spending on health. The other group is relatively neutral in the fourth 17 dimension but can be subdivided based on the second dimension: the Mediterranean countries and Austria have higher pension replacement rates than France, Germany and Belgium. 
Institutions of Education and Knowledge
Both the education of individual entrepreneurs and regional and national educational attainment have been shown to be among the strongest drivers of entrepreneurial performance, including selfemployment income, firm survival, profits and growth (Van der Sluis et al. 2008; Unger et al. 2011; Millán et al. 2014 ). For instance, Stam (2015) argues that the presence of a diverse and skilled group of workers may be the most important element of an effective entrepreneurial ecosystem (cf. Lee et al. 2004; Gennaioli et al. 2013; Millán et al. 2014 ).
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As Audretsch et al. (2006) note, innovative activities are typically considered the result of systematic and purposeful efforts to create new knowledge by investing in R&D, followed by commercialization (Griliches 1979; Chandler 1990; Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Warsh 2006) , and many models associate R&D with innovation and firm growth (cf. Pakes and Ericson 1998; Klette and Griliches 2000; Romer 1986 Romer , 1990 Aghion and Howitt 1992; Segerstrom 1995) and emphasize the importance of knowledge spillovers. Such models predominantly regard the growth process as an R&D race in which a fraction of R&D translates into successful innovations.
10 However, human capital in an entrepreneurial setting means more than formal education. In their meta-analysis, Unger et al. (2011) find that indicators of human capital that are more closely associated with entrepreneurial tasks are more closely related to entrepreneurial success, underscoring the importance of specific human capital. Pointing to Lazear's (2004) suggestion that entrepreneurs are "jacks of all trades" who need a broad combination of skills to be successful, Van der Sluis et al. (2008) argue that both the level of education and its focus (e.g., whether there are entrepreneurial training programs) are important. Unfortunately, we are unable to capture entrepreneurial-specific training, as the inclusion of these variables would substantially decrease our country coverage.
However, Acs (2009: 328) argues that although "the new growth theory is a step forward in our understanding of the growth process, the essence of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is missed." While knowledge-driven innovation is frequently regarded as the outcome of R&D activities, a set of other means of innovation, such as learning by doing, networking and combinatorial insights, suggests a role for entrepreneurs (Braunerhjelm 2011) . Table 4 , revealing two components with eigenvalues above one. Together, they explain 74% of the variation in the data. The first component has an eigenvalue of 4.97 and explains more than half of the variation in the data. Figure A7 in the appendix shows how countries perform with respect to these two components. Figure   4 shows how countries cluster when these two dimensions are considered together based on predicted values for the two components. Unsurprisingly, the first component for total governmental support is the main driver in determining country clusters; all countries (Nordic, northern Western European, and
Anglo-Saxon countries) that have positive values in this dimension are found on the right-hand side, together with Estonia and Slovenia, which exhibit moderate negative scores. Of the countries in this group, the Scandinavian countries are noteworthy with their high educational enrollment.
The left-hand side consists of Mediterranean countries and the remaining Eastern European countries.
All of these countries score relatively low in the first dimension but differ in the second dimension, with Eastern European countries showing higher enrollment rates than the Mediterranean countries.
Informal institutions
The idea that informal institutions affect economic performance is not new (Cole et al. 1992; Sabatini 2008 , see Maseland 2013 and Pasimeni and Pasimeni 2015 for a discussion). The suggested link between the culture and development of countries dates back at least as far as Weber (1930) , who argued that Protestantism provided the moral foundation for a modern market-based economy. The interest in attitudinal factors and cultural beliefs as explanations for persistent differences in institutions and economic performance has recently increased (e.g., Gorodnichenko and Roland 2011; Greif 1994; Tabellini 2008) . Putnam (1993: 167) for example, highlights the importance of social capital, the "trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." Such informal institutions can function as substitutes for formal institutions in reducing transaction costs (Arrow 1972; Glaeser et al. 2002) and are deemed highly relevant even in advanced market economies (Dixit 2009 ). For instance, a large body of literature highlights the importance of social capital for growth and productivity (Glaeser et al. 2002; Sobel 2002; La Porta et al. 1997 ) and for entrepreneurship and innovation (Brüderl and Preisendörfer 1998; Dakhli and De Clerq 2004) . Table 5 . The first two components have eigenvalues above one and explain 68% of the total variation in the data.
The first component has an eigenvalue of 2.72 and explains nearly half of the total variation.
Uncertainty avoidance and power distance load positively on this component, while the indulgence indicator determines the negative side. This result suggests that a high value of this component reflects an acceptance of power distance that relates to a will to avoid uncertainty while allowing for relatively free gratification of the basic desire to enjoy life. The second component has an eigenvalue of 1.36 and explains 23% of the total variation. Masculinity, individualism and long-term orientation have the highest loadings in this component, all of which have a positive sign. Figure A8 in the appendix shows how countries score on the first and second components. 
The Diversity of Entrepreneurial Regimes
To better understand the complementarities and features of the institutional structures underlying entrepreneurial regimes, we proceed by evaluating all the relevant institutional characteristics together.
In this section, therefore, we synthesize our analysis from section 3. Incorporating all dimensions simultaneously enables us to examine whether the links between countries belonging to the same cluster at the end appear early on, and it provides an indication of the relative coherence of the country groupings and the specific mechanisms governing institutional complementarities for each model (Amable 2003: 171) . We follow the strategy in Amable (2003) and aggregate the data in a step-by-step analysis. In each step, we apply a factor analysis, followed by a cluster analysis.
Similar to principal component analysis, factor analysis is a variable reduction technique, but the two types of analyses differ. Notably, factor analysis hinges on the idea of latent constructs (also referred to as factors, underlying constructs, or unobserved variables), which can be measured indirectly by determining their influence to responses on measured variables (Suhr 2005) . Because the diversity in entrepreneurial regimes can be considered a latent variable, factor analysis is suitable at this stage.
We begin by considering the economic, financial and political institutions (examined in section 3.2), as these variables are likely to influence entrepreneurship both directly and indirectly by shaping the other relevant institutional factors. We then add the variables of labor market and social spending (section 3.3), followed by knowledge and education institutions (section 3.4) and informal institutions (section 3.5). Finally, we incorporate indicators for entrepreneurial activity (section 3.1) to arrive at an overview of the diversity of entrepreneurial regimes.
The results of the factor analysis are available upon request. Here, we present results from the cluster analysis, as shown in Table 6 . Countries appear in rows, and the steps in the cluster analysis are presented in columns (1)-(5). For each analysis, a country is given a number representing the cluster to which it currently belongs (the actual number has no particular meaning).
Column (5) prioritize investment funds and other forms of social spending over spending on survivors and the elderly while also having low pension replacement rates (3.3); have high governmental expenditure on education and moderate school enrollment (3.4); and value individualism, long-term orientations and masculinity (3.5). Nevertheless, the countries differ with respect to their entrepreneurial regimes: the United Kingdom has little necessity-based nascent activity and moderate opportunity entrepreneurship in new and established activities, whereas Ireland has much necessity-based nascent activity, and the United States has a large amount of both (3.1).
The Nordic countries form a group akin to the social-democratic capitalism group in Amable (2003) but with the addition of Norway, which belonged to the continental group in his analysis. In fact, the countries are closely aligned with respect to all institutions investigated in section 3. Hence, the group has good legal systems and large governments (3.2) and prioritizes investment funds and other forms of social spending over spending on survivors and the elderly while also having high pension replacement rates (3.3). Furthermore, this group has high governmental expenditure in education (3.4) but does not strongly value individualism, long-term orientation and masculinity (3.5). Although all countries have relatively little necessity-based nascent entrepreneurship and moderate levels of opportunity-entrepreneurship in new and established businesses, Denmark is notable in having more aspirational and opportunity entrepreneurship (3.1).
Switzerland, a continental European country in Amable's (2003) analysis, shares many characteristics
with the group of Anglo-Saxon countries but differs slightly with respect to political and economic institutions (3.2). This country constitutes a separate and somewhat surprising category in the final model, together with the Netherlands, a country that shares many characteristics with the Nordic countries, and Austria, which shares many characteristics with the Mediterranean model. In fact, in the final analysis, these three countries appear to be grouped largely by their entrepreneurial regime, which is akin to the Nordic regime (3.1). Nevertheless, the three countries are similar in having highquality legal systems (3.2); having high governmental expenditure on research and education (3.4);
and valuing individualism, long-term orientation and masculinity (3.5).
Belgium and France form a group, and section 3 reveals similarities between the countriescombining low levels of nascent necessity-based entrepreneurship and opportunity entrepreneurship in new and established businesses (3.1); high social spending on the elderly and survivors as well as low pension replacement rates (3.3); high government expenditure on education and modest school enrollment (3.4); a preference for uncertainty avoidance, acceptance of power distance and indulgence (3.5); and a high-quality legal system (3.2).
Germany, a continental European country in Amable (2003) The Eastern European countries form a final group. These six countries are fairly closely aligned in all areas, notably with respect to the moderate to low quality of their legal systems (3.2) and their high social spending on the elderly and survivors as well as on health and pensions (3.3). The Czech
Republic and Poland appear to form a core that is similar across all analyses in section 3. Hungary also borrows some characteristics related to entrepreneurship (3.1) from the Mediterranean model.
Surprisingly, in the analysis in section 3, Slovenia differs from the other countries with respect to the entrepreneurial regime, with less necessity-based nascent activity and more aspirational and opportunity entrepreneurship (3.1).
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Conclusion/Discussion
Despite wide acknowledgement of the importance of the institutional setting for entrepreneurship, the commonly used approach in the empirical literature is to test the impact of different types of institutional characteristics on entrepreneurship against one another to identify the most relevant institutions (e.g., Estrin et al. 2013 ). This approach has important merits, as it provides policy makers with insight into which institutions matter most for entrepreneurship and, therefore, which institutions should be prioritized. However, a fuller picture of the institutional structure of a country is needed for reform agendas to be successful. This paper argues that entrepreneurship policies aimed at altering a particular institutional constraint are unlikely be sustainable in the long term because such approaches neglect the complementarities among institutions. Thus, if other institutions are not supportive of a newly implemented institution, such an institution will be more difficult to justify and more costly to maintain.
We focused on providing an empirical assessment of the complementarities and diversity of the institutional structures in 21 European countries and the United States. In summary, our exercise yielded six clusters. The first cluster consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, which exhibit striking similarities in their formal and informal institutions but actually differ in their entrepreneurial regimes. The Nordic countries form a second group that is similar across all institutional dimensions and similar in their entrepreneurial regimes. Meanwhile, wide variation exists 13 As discussed earlier, the approach of Acs et al. (2014a) has been criticized for using outcome variables as institutional indicators. To check the robustness of the findings here, we narrowed the focus of our analysis of institutional variables by excluding indicators for educational attainment, social expenditure, and research and development. Although the overall clustering of countries remains similar to the results presented in the text, a main difference is that the distinction between the Eastern European, continental European and Mediterranean countries becomes less visible. Poland and Hungary form a cluster together with Italy in this specification. For instance, in terms of entrepreneurship, Ireland now ranks 11th among the OECD countries, 9th
among the EU-28 countries and 2nd among the EU-15 countries (GEM 2015) . Despite Ireland's progress, however, access to loan finance and credit facilities from banks has been identified as constraints for entrepreneurial activity. Our findings suggest that following a strategy for financial institutions related to those used in the United States and the United Kingdom would be more useful than introducing reforms that make it easier for banks or government provide funds-a strategy followed in social democratic countries such as Denmark. However, Ireland, the United Kingdom and to some extent Switzerland are the only countries whose institutional characteristics resemble those of the United States. Hence, it is improbable that other countries could successfully imitate policy strategies of the United States and hope to achieve similar results.
In fact, our findings suggest that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to create an entrepreneurial society in Europe. Furthermore, entrepreneurship flourishes in areas other than the United States and the United Kingdom. For example, The Economist (2013) stated as follows: "The Nordic region is becoming a hothouse of entrepreneurship." The finding that this region has a very distinct institutional bundle is illustrative. Likewise, Berlin is a new attraction for start-ups. Our findings in this paper highlight the necessity of identifying entrepreneurship policies that correspond to the diversity of institutional structures in Europe.
An interesting direction for future research would be to explore the consequences of the diversity of institutional structures for different types of entrepreneurial activity. Baumol (1990) argues that institutions are likely to affect the allocation of entrepreneurial activity. The literature would benefit from more detailed research on the types of entrepreneurial activity that flourish under the different forms of institutional structure described in the current study. Furthermore, our study provides a snapshot of institutions over a limited time period and therefore does not elucidate the changes occurring in the institutional structure. The history of institutional evolution has been far from unidirectional, and institutional reversals are common throughout history (Schein 2012 ; Bergh and 
New business ownership rate
Percentage of 18-64 population who are currently a owner-manager of a new business, i.e., owning and managing a running business that has paid salaries, wages, or any other payments to the owners for more than three months, but not more than 42 months Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data
Established business ownership rate
Percentage of 18-64 population who are currently owner-manager of an established business, i.e., owning and managing a running business that has paid salaries, wages, or any other payments to the owners for more than 42 months
GEM data
Fear of failure rate Percentage of 18-64 population with positive perceived opportunities who indicate that fear of failure would prevent them from setting up a business
Entrepreneurial intention
Percentage of 18-64 population (individuals involved in any stage of entrepreneurial activity excluded) who intend to start a business within three years
GEM data
Perceived opportunities
Percentage of 18-64 who see good opportunities to start a firm in the area where they GEM data
Patents
This indicator covers data on patent applications to the European Patent Office, the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), patent applications filed under the Patent Co-operation Treaty that designate EPO, as well as Triadic patent families, largely deriving from the EPO's Worldwide Patent Statistical Database. The log of patent data is taken for the analysis.
OECD (2015c)
Nascent entrepreneurship Rate
Percentage of 18-64 population who are currently a nascent entrepreneur, i.e., actively involved in setting up a business they will own or co-own; this business has not paid salaries, wages, or any other payments to the owners for more than three months
GEM data
Perceived Capabilities
Percentage of 18-64 population who believe to have the required skills and knowledge to start a business GEM data
Growth expectation early-stage
Percentage of TEA who expect to employ at least five employees five years from now GEM data
Improvement-driven opportunity entrepreneurship
Percentage of those involved in TEA who (i) claim to be driven by opportunity as opposed to finding no other option for work; and (ii) who indicate the main driver for being involved in this opportunity is being independent or increasing their income, rather than just maintaining their income
GEM data
Necessity-driven entrepreneurship
Percentage of those involved in TEA who are involved in entrepreneurship because they had no other option for work GEM data New product early-stage entrepreneurial activity
Percentage of TEA who indicate that their product or service is new to at least some customers GEM data
International orientation early-stage entrepreneurial activity
Percentage of TEA who indicate that at least 25% of the customers come from other countries GEM data
Total early-stage entrepreneurial activity
Percentage of 18-64 population who are either a nascent entrepreneur or owner-manager of a new business GEM data
Economic and political institutions
DB construction permits
This index captures industry to build a warehouse along with the time and cost to complete each procedure. It also captures the building quality control index, evaluating the quality of building regulations, the strength of quality control and safety mechanisms, liability and insurance regimes, and professional certification requirements. The ranking of economies on the World Bank Doing Business (2015) ease of starting a business is determined by sorting their distance to frontier scores for starting a business. These scores are the simple average of the distance to frontier scores for each of the component indicators. The same methodology was applied below in construction of the other sub-indices.
DB enforcing contracts
This indicator gathers information on the quality and efficiency of the court system. It studies the codes of civil procedure and other court regulations as well as questionnaires completed by local litigation lawyers and judges.
World
Bank Doing Business (2015)
DB getting credit
This indicator is composed of two subsets of measures. The first indicator looks at whether features that facilitate lending exist within the applicable collateral and bankruptcy laws. The second set measures the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available through credit reporting service providers such as credit bureaus or credit registries.
World
DB getting electricity
This indicator looks at the procedures such as applications and contracts with electricity utilities, required for a business to obtain a permanent electricity connection and supply for a standardized warehouse.
World
DB paying taxes
This indicator records the taxes and mandatory contributions that a medium-size company must pay in a given year as well as the administrative burden of paying taxes and contributions.
World
DB protecting minority investors
This indicator looks at the protection of minority investors from conflicts of interest through one set of indicators and shareholders' rights in corporate governance through another.
World
DB registering property
This indicator looks at the easiness of registering property. It collects information on the procedures necessary for a business (the buyer) to purchase a property from another business (the seller) and to transfer the property title to the buyer's name so that the buyer can use the property for expanding its business, use the property as collateral in taking new loans or, if necessary, sell the property to another business. It also measures the time and cost to complete each of these procedures.
World
DB resolving insolvency
This indicator looks at the time, cost and outcome of insolvency proceedings involving domestic entities as well as the strength of the legal framework applicable to liquidation and reorganization proceedings.
World
DB starting business
This indicator captures all procedures officially required, or commonly done in practice, for an entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business, as well as the time and cost to complete these procedures and the paid-in minimum capital requirement.
World
DB trading across borders
This indicators looks at the time and cost related with the logistical process of exporting and importing goods.
World Bank Doing Business (2015)
FI access to sound money
This indicator is composed of four sub indices, namely money growth , standard deviation of inflation, inflation: most recent year, and Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts.
Gwartney et al. (2015)
FI freedom to trade internationally
The components in this area are designed to measure a wide variety of restraints that affect international exchange: tariffs, quotas, hidden administrative restraints, and controls on exchange rates and the movement of capital.
Gwartney et al. (2015)
FI legal structure and property rights protection
The key ingredients of a legal system consistent with economic freedom are rule of law, security of property rights, an independent and unbiased judiciary, and impartial and effective enforcement of the law. The nine components in this area are indicators of how effectively the protective functions of government are performed.
Gwartney et al. (2015)
FI regulation of credit, labor and business
This index focuses on regulatory restraints that limit the freedom of exchange in credit, labor, and product markets. It reflects conditions in the domestic credit market, provides evidence on the extent to which the banking industry is privately owned, measure the extent to which these restraints upon economic freedom are present, and measures the regulation of business activities. Gwartney et al. (2015) FI small size of government Called Size of government in the FI database. This measure indicates the extent to which countries rely on the political Gwartney et al.
process to allocate resources and goods and services. It is calculated based on four components. The first two components are government consumption as a share of total consumption and transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP. The third component measures the extent to which countries use private investment and enterprises rather than government investment and firms to direct resources. The fourth component looks at the top marginal income tax rate and the top marginal income and payroll tax rate and the income threshold at which these rates begin to apply.
(2015)
QoG Control of corruption
This indicator is measured based on the perceptions of corruption, defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. It captures the frequency of additional payments to get things done_, to the e_ects of corruption on the business environment, measuring grand corruption in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in state capture. More detailed information on this index and on the other Quality of Government (QoG) indicators can be found at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc-over Kaufman et al.
QoG Government effectiveness
This index captures on a continuous scale perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
Kaufman et al.
QoG Political Stability
This index measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism.
Kaufman et al. (2010)
QoG Regulatory quality
This index looks at the perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Kaufman et al. (2010)
QoG Rule of law
This index perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Labor markets: OECD data.
Trade union density
This indicator is defined as the percentage of employees who are members of a trade union.
OECD (2013a)
Regular employment protection legislation
This is a composite measure of employment protection for regular employment. The indicator focuses on the conditions for terminating employment, including required notification and involvement of third parties (such as courts, labor inspectorates, and workers' councils); notice periods and severance pay; the conditions under which it is permissible to lay off an employee; and the repercussions if a dismissal is found to be unfair. Most countries have additional provisions for collective dismissals.
OECD (2013b)
Temporary employment protection legislation
This index is same as the employment protection legislation index described above but constructed particularly on temporary type of employment.
OECD (2013b)
Pension funds as a percentage of GDP It is defined as pension funds as the share of GDP. OECD (2015d)
Low income male worker pension net replacement rate
This indicator is based on net pension replacement rate calculated based on the assumption that during the retirement, he will earn half of the average income. The net pension replacement rate is defined as the individual net pension entitlement divided by net pre-retirement earnings, taking account of personal income taxes and social security contributions paid by workers and pensioners.
OECD (2015e)
Medium income male worker pension net replacement rate
This indicator is based on net pension replacement rate calculated based on the assumption that during the retirement, he will the full average income.
OECD (2015e)
High income male worker pension net replacement rate
This indicator is based on net pension replacement rate calculated based on the assumption that during the retirement, he will earn one and a half times more of the average income
OECD (2015e)
Social spending family Presents public and private benefits with a social purpose grouped along family. This expenditure is often related to the costs associated with raising children or with the support of other dependents.
OECD (2016)
Social spending health Presents public and private benefits with a social purpose grouped along health.
Social spending housing Presents public and private benefits with a social purpose grouped along housing. Spending items recorded under this heading include rent subsidies and other benefits to the individual to help with housing costs.
Social spending income Presents public and private benefits with a social purpose grouped along income OECD (2016)
Social spending labor
Presents public and private benefits with a social purpose grouped along labor. This category contains all social expenditure (other than education) which is aimed at the improvement of the beneficiaries' prospect of finding gainful employment or to otherwise increase their earnings capacity.
OECD (2016)
Social spending old age
Presents public and private benefits with a social purpose grouped along elderly population. Old-age cash benefits provide an income for people retired from the labor market or guarantee incomes when a person has reached a 'standard' pensionable age or fulfilled the necessary contributory requirements. This category also includes early retirement pensions: pensions paid before the beneficiary has reached the 'standard' pensionable age relevant to the programme.
OECD (2016)
Social spending other
Presents public and private benefits with a social purpose in other fields. This category includes social expenditure (both in cash and in kind) for those people who for various reasons fall outside the scope of the relevant programme covering a particular contingency, or if this other benefit is insufficient to meet their needs. Social expenditure related to immigrants/refugees and indigenous people are separately recorded in this category.
OECD (2016)
Social spending survivors
Presents public and private benefits with a social purpose grouped along survivors. Many countries have social expenditure programmes in the public sphere, which provide the spouse or dependent of a deceased person with a benefit (either in cash or in kind). Expenditure in this policy area has been grouped under survivors. Allowances and supplements for dependent children of the recipient of a survivors' benefit are also recorded here (Adela, Fron and Ladaqiue 2011).
OECD (2016)
Social spending total presents total public and private benefits with a social purpose OECD (2016) Social spending unemployment presents public and private benefits with a social purpose grouped along unemployment OECD (2016) Knowledge and education: OECD data.
Expenditures on educational institutions
Expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP, from public sources for all levels of education OECD (2014)
Expenditure per student, primary education
Expenditure per student, primary education measured annually in equivalent USD converted using PPPs OECD (2014)
Expenditure per student, secondary education
Expenditure per student, secondary education measured annually in equivalent USD converted using PPPs OECD (2014)
Expenditure per student, tertiary education
Expenditure per student, tertiary education measured annually in equivalent USD converted using PPPs OECD (2014)
Percentage who attained tertiary degree ages 25-64
Percentage of the population which attained tertiary degree between the age group 25-64 OECD ( 
Power distance index
This dimension expresses the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. The fundamental issue here is how a society handles inequalities among people. People in societies exhibiting a large degree of Power Distance accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and which needs no further justification. In societies with low Power Distance, people strive to equalize the distribution of power and demand justification for inequalities of power. It is measured on a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 100.
Hofstede (201)
Individualism vs. collectivism
On a 0-100 continuous scale captures thee degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. collectivism, represents a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society in which individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.
Masculinity vs. femininity
The masculinity side represents a preference in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material rewards for success. Society at large is more competitive. Its opposite, femininity, stands for a preference for cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life. It is measured on a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 100.
Hofstede (2010)
Uncertainty avoidance index
It expresses the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity for future. Hofstede (2010)
Long-term orientation vs. short-term normative orientation
Societies who score low on this dimension, for example, prefer to maintain time-honoured traditions and norms while viewing societal change with suspicion. Those with a culture which scores high, on the other hand, take a more pragmatic approach: they encourage thrift and efforts in modern education as a way to prepare for the future.
Hofstede (2010) Indulgence vs. restraint
Indulgence stands for a society that allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural human drives related to enjoying life and having fun. Restraint stands for a society that suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by means of strict social norms. Figures and discussion Figure A1 shows the countries' representations in the first factorial plane. The horizontal axis is the first principal component (a higher score indicates more necessity-based nascent activity), and the vertical axis is the second principal component (a higher score signifies more opportunity-based new and established business activity). All Eastern European countries except Slovenia are grouped on the positive side of the first dimension. In the upper-right quadrant, the United States is notable for having higher levels of nascent/necessity entrepreneurship and opportunity entrepreneurship. The group of Western European and Nordic countries scores the lowest in the first dimension, along with Italywhich, together with France, Germany and Belgium, also has very low scores in the second dimension. In the upper-left quadrant, we find a group of countries characterized by less necessity-driven nascent entrepreneurship (first dimension) but more opportunity entrepreneurship (second dimension). The Nordic countries, Netherlands and Switzerland are in this group. 
Entrepreneurial Regimes
45
In Figure A2 , the vertical axis has been replaced by the third dimension, which captures a tradeoff between aspirational and opportunity entrepreneurship (+) and a form of necessity entrepreneurship characterized by many patents and established businesses (-). We note that three Eastern European countries score the highest in this dimension, together with Denmark. Meanwhile, Spain, Germany, Hungary and Portugal exhibit the highest negative scores.
Political, Financial and Economic Institutions
In Figure A3 , the horizontal axis is the first principal component (a higher score indicates higher legal quality), and the vertical axis is the second principal component (a higher score indicates smaller government, and a lower score represents greater political stability). All the Eastern European and In Figure A4 , the horizontal axis is component 3 (protection of minority investors vs. ease of registering property), and the vertical axis is component 4 (access to sound money vs. political stability). Switzerland by far has the highest positive score in the third dimension (suggesting an ease of registering property), whereas Belgium and Ireland have the highest negative value. In the fourth dimension, Italy and Spain score the highest, whereas Hungary and Ireland score the lowest. The 
Labor markets
